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<A>INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines a different kind of intersection than that considered elsewhere 
in this volume: that between potentially conflicting territorial or political identities of 
the self that arise as young people in Bulgaria and Romania attempt to reconcile their 
potential memberships of a national community, a regional Balkan identity, and a 
European identity. The educational implications of this analysis relate to young 
people in a much wider context than these two south-eastern European countries. At 
the time of writing, they are the most recent members of the European Union, joining 
in 2007, but they will have been joined by Croatia by the time this book is published, 
and very likely within the next four to six years by six or seven other Balkan states. 
Some of the implications will resonate much more widely than the Balkan peninsular: 
The tensions of multiple membership of different and nesting political entities, and of 
being a ‘global citizen’ are becoming more common and pressing across Europe and 
beyond. 
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McCall (2005) describes intersectionality as ‘the relationship among multiple 
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations’ (1171). She also 
interprets the term as encompassing ‘perspectives that completely reject the 
separability of analytic and identity categories’ (1171, footnote 1). The traditional 
axes of identity used in intersectionality (e.g. Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000; Siltanen 
and Doucet 2008) were gender and race, to which social class, ethnicity and ability 
have often been added. Intersectionality theory suggests that social oppression is not 
based on these factors in a way that is independent of each other, but that they inter-
relate and intersect to create multiple forms of oppression and discrimination (e.g. 
Ritzer 2007). 
 
In this chapter, other potentially intersecting dimensions are added to this. The 
constructions of identity by young people in south-eastern Europe—in particular in 
the two Black Sea states of Bulgaria and Romania—are structured in part by 
dimensions of nationality, regionalism and Europeanisation. These shape, and are 
shaped by, each other to create a tangled and complex nexus of suppressed or 
oppressed identities. This ‘multidimensional conceptualisation’ (Browne and Misra 
2003) may help explain how socially constructed categories of difference interact to 
create a hierarchy of social identities in these young people. Following McCall’s 
(2005) categorisation of approaches to intersectionality, I am here using both 
intercategorical and intracategorical stances: I both use the existing categorical 
distinctions of nationality, regionality and Europeanism and at the same time question 
their utility and relevance in the contemporary context. In doing this, I am simply 
reflecting the constructions advanced by the young people themselves who, while 
readily employing these categories, at the same time struggle with the distinctions and 
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contradictions between them. They appear to recognise that they, and their generation, 
cross the boundaries of constructed categories. 
 
The two countries analysed in this chapter are part of a much larger study of young 
peoples’ constructions of identity in the newer states of Europe that I am conducting. 
This one-person study, under the aegis of Jean Monnet chair, is an investigation of 
how young people between twelve and eighteen conceptualise themselves in the 
changing political circumstances of Europe, and about how they see themselves as 
different to older generations. I am working in the string of countries that have either 
joined the European Union in the 2004–2008 expansion (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) or are currently candidate countries to become members (Croatia, Iceland, 
Macedonia and Turkey). The political status of many of these countries has changed 
over the past twenty years, from being behind the Iron Curtain to being part of the 
European Union, or about to join the Union—and in these particular countries, such as 
Bulgaria and Romania, young people in their teens will be the first generation to be 
born, and thus wholly socialised, within these new polities. 
 
An individual’s civic identity and citizenship has usually been singular, traditionally 
associated with a defined and exclusive area (Mackenzie 1978). However, this has in 
many cases become partially eroded through processes such as globalisation, large-
scale migration and the development of dual citizenship (Jopkke 2010). Those 
countries in the European Union now have a citizenship additional to the citizenship 
of their own country: they are also citizens of the European Union, and this gives 
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them some rights and privileges that are superior to those given by their own country. 
Identities are increasingly recognised as being both multiple and constructed 
contingently, and may include a range of intersecting dimensions, including gender, 
age and region (Lutz, Kritzinger and Skirbekk 2006). How do young people manage 
to construct these related but different identities? Are there tensions between these 
constructions, or can they be reconciled (Licata, 2000)? Young people in these 
countries are attempting this in very different conditions to those experienced by their 
parents or their grandparents at the same age: Are they conscious of this? Does it 
make them feel different in any way?  
 
<A>METHODOLOGY 
These are complex questions. Rather than use questionnaires or interviews, both of 
which impose direction and meaning on the subject, I am using focus groups to 
stimulate discussions on these topics between small groups of young people (Marshall 
and Rossman 1999). Because this study is of how young peoples’ ideas are socially 
constructed, and because social constructions are created through interaction in a 
social context, focus groups have the advantages of being able to allow the 
investigator a modest degree of access to the discourses they may use between 
themselves, and allowing the young people to an extent to set an agenda for what 
appears to them to be relevant to their own lives. They are not, of course, wholly free 
in this: I try to steer the conversation to cover the topics on which I am focusing, 
although they only discuss and reveal what they choose. I cannot always be sure of 
the meaning of the terms that they use, and to continually demand explanations would 
turn the discussion into an interrogation and vitiate the purpose of the focus group. 
Questionnaires pre-construct conceptualisations, putting words into the mouth of the 
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respondent: I want to hear their own constructs. The discussions I have had are not 
simply a dialogue, but an interchange that is largely between the young people 
themselves, in which they use their own vocabulary and structures, not mine. A focus 
group is not simply a serial semi-structured interview, in which the same question is 
put in sequence to each member of the group. It is more of a discussion—primarily 
between the young people themselves—into which I put a number of issues on which 
to focus. They may be in the form of questions, but they are questions that are clearly 
structured to indicate that I do not know what the answer might be. I participate in the 
discussion—sometimes with phatic expressions or with gestures, to keep the 
conversation going, sometimes with naive requests for explanations, occasionally with 
a challenge or an assertion that one of them has contradicted themselves—but always 
in ways that show that I am listening to and respecting their opinions. 
 
I have now conducted almost 160 focus groups, with over 970 young people in fifty 
different locations in these countries. In each of these locations one to three schools 
were selected in areas with different social backgrounds, and in most schools there 
was a group of twelve- to fifteen-year-olds and one of fifteen- to eighteen-year-olds. 
Permission was sought from the young people and, for those under sixteen, from their 
parents. The sample is not representative, nor was it intended to be, but it illustrates 
the diversity of views expressed.   
 
In some countries I have to do this with simultaneous interpretation, particularly with 
younger age groups. This requires particularly sympathetic translators, well 
acquainted with the ideas I am seeking to explore: I have been particularly fortunate 
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in having built up a network of colleagues in many of these countries who have 
helped me do this. The project would not have been possible without help from many 
people.1 Schools and parents have been recruited, arrangements made for visits and, 
critically, help given in translating many of the transcripts. With many older groups in 
both of these countries I was able to work most of the time in English, accompanied 
by interpreters who help translate particular phrases or vocabulary that presents 
difficulties. It is not perfect; but it is practical.  
 
I worked in seven locations in these two countries, as shown in Table 14.1. 
 
Table 14.1  Locations of Focus Groups in Bulgaria and Romania  
Bulgaria 
Locations Population Number 
of 
Schools 
Number 
of 
Groups 
Number 
of 
Students 
Dates of 
Interviews 
                                                 
1 I am particularly grateful to (Bulgaria): Katia Christova, Evelina Kelbetcheva, Katya 
Simeonova, Galia Slavcheva and Mirela Vasilva, and (Romania) Ciprian Ceobanu, 
Carmen Ceobanu, Magda Ciubancan, Magda Danicu, Carmen Dutu, Alin Gavreliuc, 
Aurora Goia, Tudor Iordachescu, Simona Laurian, Elena Mazareanu, Eleana Mitu, 
Monica Oprescu and Monica Secui; also the heads/principals of the schools and the 
students, and at London Metropolitan University, colleagues in IPSE, particularly 
Angela Kamara. 
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Veliko 
Tarnovo 
69,000 
2 2 12 
27 
April 22–23, 
2010 
2 2 15 
March 15, 
2012 
Blagoevgrad 71,000 
1 3 19 
March 14, 
2012 
Sofia 1,292,000 
2 4 26 
March 16, 
2012 
3   6 11 72  
 
Romania 
Locations Population Number 
of 
Schools 
Number 
of 
Classes 
Number 
of 
Students 
Dates of 
Interviews 
Timişoara 307,000 
2 4 26 
October 11–
12, 2011 
Oradea 206,000 2 4 25 October 13–14 
Iaşi 317,000 2 4 30 October 17–18 
Bucureşti 1,930,000 4 4 24 October 19–20 
4   10 16 105  
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<A>IDENTITIES IN CONTEXT  
I have used two particular frameworks in my analysis of the construction of identities 
in this analysis of these two countries. Michael Bruter (2005), analysing the 
emergence of mass European identity, describes territorial identities as having two 
component elements, the ‘civic’—identification with ‘the set of institutions, rights and 
rules that preside over the political life of the community’ (12)—and the ‘cultural’—
identification with ‘a certain culture, social similarities, values’ (12). This potential 
dichotomy between civic and cultural Lynn Jamieson and Sue Grundy (2007) describe 
how some young people ‘come to present themselves as passionate utopian 
Europeans, while for many being European remains emotionally insignificant and 
devoid of imagined community or steps towards global citizenship’ (663). 
In addition to these frameworks, I will also raise a couple of specific themes that arose 
in Bulgaria and Romania that pervaded much of their talk: firstly, a tension between a 
sense of powerlessness and an assertion of agency in terms of their ability to 
participate effectively in Romanian society; and, secondly, a profound ambivalence 
about Romania’s location within Europe. Liminality emerges as a defining theme. 
Many young people in both countries professed elements or quality of ambiguity or 
disorientation (Turner 1967): they appear conscious of ‘standing at the threshold’ 
between their own nationality and Europe, and in some ways to be oppressed, or at 
least isolated by each of these. The intersection of national identity and European 
identity created tensions and alienation. 
Deleted: 633
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<A>BULGARIA AND ROMANIA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND  
It might for some readers be useful at this point to provide a very brief outline of the 
development of these two states—much of this informs contemporary constructions of 
identities. The two countries, although neighbours with broadly similar economies, 
have had very different histories. 
 
Bulgaria has a population of about 7.5 million people and, with a per capita GDP of 
about €11,200 a year, is the poorest country in the Union—the purchasing power per 
capita is about 45 per cent of the EU average. Romania has, in European Union terms, 
a large population of 21.4 million, and with a per capita GDP of about €11,700, it is 
the second poorest EU country: but it has a large territory (ninth in size in the EU). 
Both joined the EU in 2007, but neither is a member of the Schengen area or in the 
Eurozone. Both largely agricultural countries with a predominantly rural population in 
the late 1940s, by the 1980s had become industrial economies. Following the end of 
the Communist period (1989–1990) the shock of entering a market economy caused a 
sharp drop in industrial and agricultural production and economic collapse in the late 
1990s. Growth in both countries was strong in the early 2000s, but contracted in 2009; 
since when growth has been positive, but low. Unemployment is at 7 per cent in 
Romania and 12 per cent in Bulgaria.  
 
In the tenth century Greater Bulgaria was a large and substantial Balkan power, but 
then became provinces of the Byzantium Empire. The restored second Bulgarian 
Empire fell to the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth century, and it remained part 
of that empire till 1876, when a poorly organised revolt was easily crushed by 
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Ottoman troops: tens of thousands were massacred. The Russians, considering 
themselves champions of the Slavs and seeking to expand their hegemony toward the 
Mediterranean coast, declared war on the Ottomans, liberating most of Bulgaria by 
early 1878. The consequent Treaty of San Stefano established a large 
autonomous Bulgarian principality, but the other Great Powers resisted the creation of 
a Russian client state of this size. The Treaty of Berlin, later in 1878, scaled back the 
Bulgarian frontier, and carved part of Bulgaria proper into a principality of Rumelia, 
leaving many ethnic Bulgarians outside the new country and setting Bulgaria on a 
militaristic approach to foreign affairs.  
 
In 1885 they absorbed Rumelia, and in 1911 they allied with Greece and Serbia to 
jointly attack the Ottomans and partition Macedonia and Thrace between them. In the 
First Balkan War of October 1912 these allies took most of Turkey’s European 
territory. Bulgaria tried to seize the largest share, but the Serbs refused to vacate 
Macedonia: Serbia and Greece formed a new alliance against Bulgaria, who lost the 
Second Balkan War of 1913 and had to relinquish most of Macedonia to Serbia and 
Greece. Maps of the boundaries before and after these wars are still on classroom 
walls in many schools in the Balkan states. In World War I the Bulgarians aligned 
themselves with Germany and Austria-Hungary (in return for a promise of acquiring 
Macedonia): they won military victories against Serbia and Romania, and in 1917 
defeated Britain, France, Russia and Romania. But anti-war and anti-monarchist 
sentiment led to the proclamation of a republic in 1918. In the post–World War I 
settlements, Bulgaria ceded its Aegean coastline to Greece, recognised Yugoslavia 
(nearly all of Macedonia went to the new state), reduced its army to 1.5 per cent of its 
previous size and had to pay reparations exceeding $400 million. Bulgarians generally 
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refer to the results of the treaty as the ‘Second National Catastrophe’. In the Second 
World War initial hopes of remaining neutral ended when the German forces 
demanded passage through Bulgaria in their attack on Greece in 1941. The Bulgarians 
formally joined the fascist bloc until August 1944, when the Romanians left the Axis 
Powers and declared war on Germany and allowed Soviet forces to cross its territory 
to reach Bulgaria.  
 
The Soviet Union occupied the country, which became the People’s Republic of 
Bulgaria, ruled by the Bulgarian Communist Party. After an oppressive Stalinist phase 
there was from the early 1950s a degree of liberalisation and economic development. 
Standards of living began to rise, but there was also an assimilation campaign directed 
against ethnic Turks in the 1980s: some three hundred thousand Bulgarian Turks left 
for Turkey, and agricultural production slumped. The collapse of Communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe after the summer of 1989 led to demonstrations in Sofia that 
became a campaign for political reform. Free elections held in the summer of 1990 
were won by the Communist Party, ridden of its hardliner wing and renamed 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In 1991 a new constitution created a parliamentary 
republic with a directly elected president and a prime minister accountable to the 
legislature. The 1990s saw several changes of government and massive 
unemployment as uncompetitive industries failed and the backward state of Bulgaria's 
industry and infrastructure were revealed (Spirova 2010). 
 
Romania, although like Bulgaria largely Orthodox Christian, has a Romance language 
that marks the inheritance of the Roman Empire in the second and third centuries. 
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Three principalities of Wallachia, Moldova and Transylvania emerged in the middle 
ages. Transylvania became an autonomous part of the Hungarian kingdom—there is a 
substantial Hungarian population still there—whereas Wallachia and Moldavia had a 
greater degree of independence. By the mid-sixteenth century, all three, and most of 
Hungary, became Ottoman provinces. But the provinces maintained a large degree of 
internal autonomy. Transylvania was absorbed by the Hungarians in 1700, and the 
Russians annexed eastern Moldavia in 1812. Nationalist uprisings in the first half of 
the nineteenth century against the Ottomans led to the new United Provinces of 
Wallachia and Moldova in 1859: Transylvania remained with the Austro-Hungarians, 
who were seen by the Great Powers as a more powerful bulwark against Russian 
expansion. Romania sided with the Russians in the Russo-Turkish War in 1878 that 
liberated Bulgaria, gaining some territory as a consequence. Romania joined the 
Allied forces in 1916 in return for a promise that it would be given Transylvania, 
which was subsequently agreed at the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, creating România 
Mare: ‘Greater Romania’. In the Second World War Romania also initially attempted 
neutrality, but first Soviet and then Nazi pressures led to Romania joining the Axis 
powers (loosing Transylvania to the Hungarians and southern Dobruja to the 
Bulgarians). Romania was a major source of oil for the Axis powers, but the Soviet 
army moved into Romania in August 1944, and a coup led to Romania changing 
sides.  
 
The Soviet occupation led to the establishment of a Communist government, and 
Romania was under direct military occupation and economic control till the late 
1950s. The Romanian government used the Securitate to eliminate state enemies. 
Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power in 1965 and pursued policies more independent of 
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the USSR—condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example. This 
led to substantial Western investment, but pressure from the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund then led to Ceauşescu reimbursing all foreign debt 
through policies that impoverished the Romanian people—and reinforced the powers 
of the police state and his own personality cult. Stan (2010) observed ‘of all 
communist Central and Eastern European countries, Romania remained the least 
reformed, the most likely to deny basic human rights, and the only one with a 
sultanist-cum-totalitarian regime right up (to the moment when communism 
collapsed)’ (380).  
 
In December 1989 the Romanian Revolution became the most violent and forceful 
overthrow of a Communist regime. There were over eleven hundred deaths, including 
the execution of Ceauşescu and his wife on Christmas day. However, the leaders of 
the revolution were essentially Communist leaders who were disaffected with 
Ceauşescu’s personality cult. The National Salvation Front took some partial ‘original 
democracy’ and liberal marketisation measures, but did not renounce Communism. 
Romania developed closer ties with Western Europe, joining NATO in 2004, and 
the European Union in January 2007. Romania has a growing diaspora of about 
two million people (in Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Canada 
and the US) (Stan 2010). 
 
<A>HOW DO YOUNG PEOPLE CONSTRUCT THEIR IDENTITIES? 
These histories have a continuing effect on the narratives recounted in school 
curricula. For the purposes of this study, these events have meant that these young 
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people have had radically different experiences to those of their grandparents and 
parents. Do young people identify with the cultural and civic aspects of Europe? Do 
they use the same components in their identification with their country? Are they 
passionate or indifferent about each? Do they acknowledge a multiplicity of identities, 
or is their identity singular and essentialist? Does their sense of identity require the 
construction of ‘the Other’, an alien identity held in juxtaposition to their own 
identity? This question is of particular significance to the subjects of this study: As the 
borders of the European Union continue to demonstrate their flexibility, are there (in 
the minds of these young people) limits to Europe? Where does the frontier lie?  
 
Focus groups offer a powerful way to address these questions. My opening question 
challenged them to describe themselves and their identity. What did it mean to them 
to be Bulgarian or Romanian? How else might they describe themselves, and did they 
think their parents and grandparents feel this in the same way as them? Did everyone 
in the country feel the same? I then asked if they sometimes felt European, and how 
they might describe the characteristics of a ‘European’. Finally, I asked them to 
consider the possible advantages and disadvantages of particular other countries 
joining the European Union. Could, for example, Russia or Turkey or Serbia become 
a member of the same club? These countries, as will have become clear, had various 
historical relationships with each of these two countries.  
 
Analysis of the discussions showed a wide variety of responses, but there were some 
particularly interesting trends evident. The ways in which they expressed their 
identification with their own country were often qualified: There were reservations 
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about what were sometimes seen as shortcomings in their compatriots. These in turn 
made them uncertain about having a sense of European identity: Europeans were 
thought to have behavioural characteristics that were not (or could not) be matched by 
Bulgarians or Romanians. They might be members of the European Union, but 
nevertheless felt that they were accepted on sufferance, and that they were not really 
European—or, at least, not European yet. Neither nationals nor Europeans, they were 
in a liminal borderland situation, neither one thing nor the other. Asking if Russia or 
Turkey might be thought of as European produced further confusion and possible 
marginalisation. The intersections of national identity and European identity produced 
uncertainty. 
 
<B>National Identities  
In both countries there was certainly evidence of pride in the country by many young 
people. This was sometimes simply seen as a natural response to having been born 
and brought up in the country. For example, Basia K (BG♀ 17¾) described Bulgaria 
as ‘my native country, it’s my home. I feel like I’m in the right place. I want to be 
here’ (her father was a construction worker and her mother unemployed). In Romania, 
Oana N (♀ 13½ ) said, ‘I have been in many countries, and here I feel like home. 
There, when I am on the street, I feel very strange’. But Erika I (♀ 16¾), in 
Timisoara, was not unusual when she said, ‘Being Romanian doesn’t mean that much 
to me. I mean this is the country where I was born—but I don’t feel related to it. This 
is my house, but not my home’. Nationality was simply an ascribed characteristic—
and not the most important one. Two Bulgarians put this succinctly: ‘I think it doesn’t 
matter if we are Bulgarian, or if someone is Turkish … the nation doesn’t matter, we 
are all human, and we have to be open to other countries, other nations’ (Pavlina P, ♀ 
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15¾ ); ‘I am proud of being Bulgarian, too, but in these days the nation is just a 
formality. It doesn’t matter where you are born, or where you come from’ (Gavril D, 
♂ 15½). 
 
These feelings of pride in one’s country were related to both history and culture, 
rather than political institutions and the structures of the state. Particularly in Bulgaria 
there were references to pride at having survived the ‘five centuries’ ‘under the 
Turkish yoke’. Borislav T (♂ 16¾) said, ‘We have been five hundred years under 
Turkey, but we had the power to rise and take our country again, after five hundred 
years, which I think is pretty good thing to do—because five hundred years, for you to 
keep your nationality alive—this is something big’. But the references to Bulgarian 
culture sometimes included implicit or explicit recognition of the Ottoman elements 
within this, as when Vladislav P (♂ 12½) talked of ‘Bulgarian traditions are some of 
the most colourful—their songs and their food—and ayran is very good’,2 or when 
Valentin P (♂ 16½) referred to the culture as ‘really interesting, because we’re right 
on the border of Europe and Asia, and we have something from both cultures’. There 
were as many references to historical pride in Romania, such as Daniela D (♀ 17½): 
‘Being Romanian means having a certain respect for the historical people, and I’m 
very proud that, after several wars and fights with other powers, we managed to be all 
right in the end, even if we are not as good as the other countries’. 
 
                                                 
2 Ayran: a cold beverage of yogurt mixed with cold water and sometimes salt; it is 
popular in many Central Asian, Middle Eastern and south-eastern European countries. 
415 
 
 
The second major area of national pride in both countries was in the natural landscape 
and the flora and fauna. But this was frequently qualified with references to how some 
of their compatriots’ disregard the environment, and pollution and littering were often 
mentioned. In Bulgaria, Arnost M (♂ 12¾) said, ‘Pollution is everywhere—all the 
people throw their waste on the roads. In the forests they cut down trees, and they just 
destroy the nature in Bulgaria’. And in Romania Silvia P (♀ 16) said, ‘We do not 
know how to appreciate [the country]—to preserve this, not to throw garbage on the 
streets’.  
 
In parallel to expressions of positive feelings for the country were widespread 
criticisms of the way in which Bulgarians and Romanians behaved. In both countries 
there were many ad hominem comments that ‘people’ (a term that apparently did not 
include the young people in the discussion groups) had ways of thinking (often ‘a 
mentality’) that was selfish, anti-social or simply old-fashioned. Thus Mircea D (♀ 
16¼), a worker’s daughter in western Romania, said, ‘Sometimes you are ashamed of 
being Romanian, because other people do all kinds of unpleasant things’. Fellow 
citizens often behaved badly, especially those working abroad, and the Roma minority 
were particularly criticised in Romania (less so in Bulgaria). In both countries, 
politicians were criticised as self-serving and often corrupt. These factors, they said, 
led to their countries being perceived badly by members of other European states. The 
following paragraphs examine each of these assertions in turn.  
 
In both countries there were complaints that people were inclined to talk about 
problems, rather than actively seek solutions. In Bulgaria, Branimir B (♂ 16¾) said he 
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was ‘not proud that Bulgarians talk, but they don’t take action when they … don’t like 
something’. People were selfish, and there were popular expressions about this: in 
Romania, Ionut M (♂ 14¼) said, ‘They care only if my dog dies, the neighbour’s dog 
should die, too’, whereas in Bulgaria, Borislav T (♂ 16¾) said that ‘we look at the 
other [person]’s plate. If I have a problem, I want my neighbour to [have one], too. … 
There is a pot in hell full of Bulgarians—nobody can get out of it, because each 
person pulls down the others’. 
 
There was, they claimed, a common disregard for civil rights: Nikolai C (BG ♂ 15½) 
said, ‘We don’t search for our rights—in other countries, you see something that you 
don’t like, you … tell the police and they take the case—problem solved. But in 
Bulgaria you just close your eyes to it, and don’t pay any attention to what happened’. 
Izabela U (RO ♀ 16) said (in a rare reference to gender equality) that ‘in Romania that 
the men are seen as more important than the women—the man defines the place’. 
 
Several Romanians said that their compatriots were feckless. Ionut M (♂ 14¼): ‘my 
country ... has people who are like sheep. They follow each other, they do as their 
neighbours’. Gabi B (♂ 11½) said, ‘People in Romania … want to finish work too 
soon, to work less’. Bulgarians were said to have antiquated patterns of thinking: 
When Daniel B (♂ 16½) said, ‘I think our thinking is old. We are not open-minded 
enough’, Ventsislav K (♂ 16½) offered an explanation ‘about old-fashioned thinking 
… this is because we have been slaves for about five hundred years—this is why we 
are not so modern and open-minded’.  
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In Romania, the Roma minority in particular were criticised, and there was some 
indignation that this community had appropriated the term ‘Roma’: Several said that 
the Roma were not Romanian. Lucian S (♂ 12¾) asserted that ‘the Gypsies are harsh 
and they mug you and try to do a lot of bad things’. Nina A (♀ 14¾) said that they 
‘were not Romanian, they are different from the Romanian people—they are their 
own nationality. Europeans make this confusion, that Romanians and Gypsies are the 
same’. ‘Our reputation is very low because the Gypsies who are born in Romania 
have Romanian passports—they are not really Romanians’, Dumitru D (♂ 14¼) 
explained. Even expressions of sympathy were constructed through terms of 
‘othering’ and blame: Jean R (♂ 17½) ‘the Gypsies … don’t realise that they are the 
ones who trigger that attitude from us, because they are the ones who have 
misconduct’. In Bulgaria, attitudes appeared rather different: speaking of minorities 
within the country, Nikola A (♂ 16) said, ‘Some ethnic groups which are isolated 
from the social life of Bulgarian … society—they won’t feel as patriotic as the not-
isolated Bulgarians—Gypsies, Turkish, [those] kind of people’. Anti-Roma feeling 
was associated with older generations: Aleksandar C (♂ 13¾) said his ‘grandfather 
thinks that all the problems in Bulgaria come from the Gypsies and marginal groups’, 
to which Teodor T (♂ 13½) added, ‘the Roma are not bad people—I [think] … that 
it’s people from all groups who make problems—the problem isn’t just in this group’. 
 
In both countries, politicians were criticised as self-serving and often corrupt. In 
Bulgaria, Toma S (♂ 12½) said, ‘Politicians are liars …. most Bulgarians don’t like 
Bulgaria because of the government’. Anton L (♂ 17¾) said, ‘they stole assets’, and 
Bogdan G (♂ 13) that ‘the president or the prime minister … say they will do 
something about the problems, but do nothing, just get votes and take the money’. In 
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Romania, Cosmin L (♂ 13¾) claimed, ‘The government simply destroys everything. 
The people … hate the government, but they keep voting for the same rubbish leaders, 
again and again’. Corruption was mentioned frequently: Marian T (♂ 15¾) was ‘very 
concerned about corruption—in Romania there is a lot … especially at a high level’. 
And Ana P (♀ 13½) said, ‘President Băsescu has I don’t know how many houses! All 
our money is in their pockets, and nobody does anything about it’. In Bulgaria, Sergei 
S (♂ 16) complained, ‘What pisses me off is that we see corruption at the lower 
levels—there is a corruption everywhere, but in other countries its at the higher levels 
and people don’t see it’. 
 
These behavioural characteristics were all seen as contributing to the poor perception 
of their countries by members of other European states. This was sometimes based on 
personal experiences, or those of family members: Abela F (♂ 14¾), from Romania, 
said she ‘went to France for a summer vacation—I spoke with my parents in 
Romanian, and everyone was looking at us in the metro like this [arms crossed across 
front to guard wallet, bags, etc]—with their bag and that—being Romanian these days 
isn’t very nice, because we are seen as thieves, Gypsies and so on’. Milenka P (BG ♀ 
13¾ ) described how her brother ‘has been living in Germany for about seven years, 
and he says that when he says he’s a Bulgarian he’s treated not as a person’. Some 
were aware of negative media attention: In Bulgaria there were references to a recent 
right-wing Netherlands political party’s website that had been making derogatory 
comments about Bulgarians: Toma S (♂ 12½) said that as a consequence, people in 
the Netherlands ‘when they hear Bulgarian they think “Oh, this is rubbish”, because 
our reputation in Europe is very, very bad’. 
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These comments were frequently tinged with expressions of a sense of powerlessness, 
that they lacked the agency to affect society and politics. In Romania, Olga M (♀ 16) 
said, ‘We don’t have the power to change … we’ve tried to change the president and 
to encourage our parents to vote for someone else—but it’s still the same—men want 
power, and when they have it, they make use of it’. And Amelia S (♀ 16.0) felt, ‘We 
cannot make any changes because of the bad things, and the bad systems have very 
deep roots’. There were also assertions that they could make an impact: Amelia S also 
said, ‘We are responsible, being Romanian. We have our rights and responsibilities, 
and we have to improve the situation—not only ours, but the others around us’, and 
Basia K (♀ 17¾) said, ‘The future of Bulgaria is in our hands, our generation’s’—to 
which Ivana P (♀ 17¾) retorted, ‘Yes—but if you go abroad, you will not change 
anything’. This issue, of young people wanting to migrate from Bulgaria or Romania, 
was divisive. Borislav T (BG ♂ 16¾) explained that ‘there are two types of people of 
our age now—people who want to leave, who don’t want to live here and think that if 
they go abroad they will have a better life—and people who are proud of being 
Bulgarian, who love the country and want to stay. I think the first kind is bigger—a 
lot of people want to leave’. This group was exemplified by the comments of Fidanka 
M (♀ 16)—‘I don’t think that Bulgaria will provide me with a good job, because the 
payment is very low ... I have ambitions to work in Europe. Or in America’, and of 
Anelie V (♀ 16¾)—‘maybe in the future I won’t live here—I don’t like the country’. 
 
These young peoples’ identification with Bulgaria and Romania respectively appears 
to be strong on the cultural side: There were many expressions of affection for the 
country. But this was a feeling of warmth, rather than of chauvinism. There were very 
few remarks that could be construed as nationalistic, and a number that were 
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explicitly non-nationalistic or showing sympathy for a more global identification. But 
there was also a pervasive critical element about aspects of Bulgarian and Romanian 
behaviour, and references to outdated ‘ways of thinking’ and to conduct that they 
thought inappropriate. Generally there were few references to the institutions of either 
state, apart from historical references to independence.   
 
<B>European Identities 
This sense of uncertainty and diffidence about their construction of a national identity 
was paralleled in the European sphere. A European identity was acknowledged by 
some, but a sense of distance, of hesitancy, about ‘being part of Europe’ was more 
commonly articulated. Most saw European identity as distinctly subordinated or 
secondary to their sense of being Romanian or Bulgarian. Thus Mihail B (RO ♂ 15¾) 
said he felt ‘more Romanian than European—I don’t really have the thought of being 
European that often’. Others said that they were European simply in the geographical 
sense: Nikola A (BG ♂ 16) said that ‘every country that is in the territory of Europe, 
every nationality, should feel European … it doesn’t matter if it’s in the European 
Union or not—we’re all European, even though some countries aren’t as advanced as 
Germany, Italy, those kind of countries’. Vladimär M (BG ♂ 13½) said, ‘I don’t think 
we should feel European—we are in Europe, on the continent’. For others, it was 
simply a consequence of European Union membership that made them European: so 
Todor R (BG ♂ 14) asserted, ‘We are surrounded by Europe. We are part of the 
European Union, and we became [a member] in 2008’.  
But many of these and similar expressions concerned Bulgaria or Romania as a 
country being European, rather than being individual feeling of a European identity. 
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Many suggested that they might, as Romanians or Bulgarians, be European in a titular 
sense, but that in reality this was not accepted by ‘the Europeans’ themselves. Others 
said that they did include a European dimension in their identity, but they were also 
aware of being rebuffed in this. ‘They’ were constructed as something different from 
‘us’ and Europeanism was to be defined on ‘their’ terms. Consequently, some of these 
young people felt that Europe had rejected them—or at least, had not accepted them 
(as in the example of the Netherlands in the preceding). So Abela F (RO ♂ 14¾) said, 
‘In the registers, they say we are, we are Europeans—but I don’t feel like it’, and 
Loredana Z (♀ 13¼) said, ‘I feel European, but the other people in Europe discourage 
us’. How could Romanians feel European, asked Anatolie U (♂ 13½), if everyone in 
the other European countries ‘says that we shouldn’t be in the European Union, and 
that we don’t deserve to be?’  
 
There was a sense that ‘being European’ meant either belonging to a more developed 
economy or to having a different culture and mentality. In Bulgaria, Rada V (♀ 15½) 
simply said that ‘the other countries in Europe are much more advanced than us’, and 
Fidanka M (♀ 16) said she found it ‘a little hard to feel like Europeans, because there 
are some big differences between the Bulgarians and some European countries’. In 
Romania, Mirela B (♀ 16¾) claimed that to be European ‘means being part of a 
developed country, being respected’. Being a European meant behaving in a particular 
(and non-Bulgarian) way for Teodor T (♂ 13½): ‘I feel Bulgarian when I see someone 
throwing trash in the streets; I feel European when I make him pick it up and put it in 
the bin’. Europeans were in some way better able, or more likely, to follow social 
rules. Although the examples often given were of throwing litter on the street, there 
was a sort of bystander response (Darley and Latané 1968): Bulgarians and 
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Romanians would not follow rules (the young people said) unless everybody else 
followed them. Vladimär M (BG ♂ 13½) suggested that ‘maybe their [i.e. 
European’s] rules make them different from other people … they are actually trying to 
do something’, and Elisaveta M (♀ 16½) said, ‘It’s a question of our thinking … 
maybe they [Europeans] keep with the rules, because here in Bulgaria we are always 
saying, “why should I do it, because the person next to me isn’t doing it?”’ 
 
In particular, ‘Europeans’ were held to have a different mind-set, a different 
‘mentality’ to the Bulgarians and Romanians. Anelie V (BG ♀ 16¾) said, ‘I don’t feel 
like a European person … everyone thinks only for themselves, out of self-interest’. 
For Elisaveta M (BG ♀ 16½), ‘it’s not about how we feel; it’s about our thinking’; 
Borislav T (♂ 16¾) echoed this—‘our thinking is not like theirs …. people from 
Europe [are] better in the things [they] do … much better mannered … better-
educated people’. Olga M (♀ 12) talked at length about striving to be European and to 
be different: ‘Bulgaria in some ways doesn’t let me be a European, because I don’t 
always think before I act … that’s why I want to be a European someday. … Europe 
is different because of its culture and its heritage—people in Europe are more self-
aware’.  
 
Europe was ‘over there’ in the West, a different place where they behaved differently 
and in what was seen as a more ‘civilised’ way. Vladislav P (BG ♂ 12½) explained 
that ‘to be European … you must behave like a European, and Bulgarians don’t 
behave like this … Europeans behave very well, they are polite to shop assistants—
some Bulgarians are rude to them; and in European countries everyone has manners’. 
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Dumitru D (RO ♂14¼) also felt that ‘they [Europeans] are not too different from us, 
but they have a higher intelligence level than we have—and they are more civilised’.  
It seems that what ran through many of these comments was a sense of not feeling 
fully European, or fully European yet. For some, this was simply a matter of material 
progress: Borislaw A (BG ♂ 12½) said that in Greece he had seen little pollution and 
well-made streets—‘it makes people have a European sense. In Bulgaria we have the 
opposite—so we are not Europeans’. Gala I (♀ 13¾) said she ‘would feel European if 
we could end the problems that are affecting our parents; the lack of work’. Europe 
was thus, in a sense, elsewhere, not to be found in this part of the world. Vlad P (♂ 
17¼) spoke of Romanian culture as Eastern European: ‘in the Balkan regions there 
are very powerful Slavic influences’; for him, the heart of Europe was in Western 
Europe—‘the bedrock of Europe, so to speak—it has achieved some degree of 
cultural dominance’. Madalina B (RO ♀ 16¼) referred to Europe as ‘in Finland and 
those countries, they are more civilised and organised’.  
 
There was a sense of liminality, of being on the border of being European and perhaps 
of anticipation of the potential to cross that frontier. Toma S (♂ 12½) said, ‘I don’t 
think we are Europeans yet …. The country is not really European, because it’s not 
improved to a European level, so it’s not European yet’. Nikolai C (♂ 15½) put it this 
way: ‘We’ve been through bad times … that’s why it’s a bit harder for us to accept 
ourselves as part of Europe’. Valentin P (BG ♂ 16½) said, ‘I think that in five, ten 
years’ time we will say that we are European’. Both Romanian and Bulgarian young 
people had a view that their countries were marginal to Europe and marginalised by 
Europe. They seem aware that they may be on the threshold of some new, European 
way of political and cultural expression (Thomassen 2009). In a period of liminality 
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social hierarchies are in flux, traditions may become indeterminate and the future of 
these young people see for themselves is fluid and uncertain (see Horvath, Thomassen 
and Wydra 2009).   
 
A few instead—or as well—asserted an alternative Balkan identity: Sergei S (♂ 16) is 
typical of these: ‘I mostly feel like a man from the Balkans, not so much a European 
because we have a different structure here, in our thinking. I don’t feel like a person 
of my age from England or France, for example—we have a lot of differences—but a 
guy from Serbia or Montenegro, I think I’d be similar to him’. Europe was 
somewhere else, said Gogu G (RO ♂ 14¼ )—it was ‘Germany, France, Italy, Spain—
a lot of countries. I guess it’s about us, and maybe the Bulgarians—we didn’t take 
advantage of being in the European Union until now. …They have another way of 
thinking—they think differently to us’. 
 
Europe was thus for some of these young people a problematic construct. It was in 
some senses a desirable attainment, but as yet not achieved, and at the same time had 
an exclusiveness that meant that they felt rejected. Europe was thus seen partly as 
cultural—something that Bulgarians and Romanians ‘ought’ to share, but of which 
there was some uncertainty, and also to do with something described as ‘behaviour’, 
which seemed to encompass activities from financial probity to being conscious not to 
litter the streets, where it was felt that they fell short. But Europe was seen also as 
institutional, and here there was a greater sense of focus and of anticipation. Yet 
Europe, in an emotional sense, remained distant, cut off partly by the attitude of 
‘other’ Europeans to them, partly by their own distrust of their ‘mentality’. 
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<B>Constructions of European Identities and of the Boundaries of Europe 
These constructions were given a different twist when groups were asked to consider 
the possibility of particular other potential partners in the European Union. I asked 
them first to consider the possibility of Russian membership and then Turkey: Both 
countries have played significant roles in their countries’ histories. Instead of 
presenting short quotations from different groups, I now present some longer extracts 
from a single group in Iaşi, Romania. 
 
Asked if they felt that they might consider themselves as European, Cristian T (♂ 
16½), son of a builder and a postal delivery worker, said:  
 
No, I don’t think so. Because we can’t compare ourselves to European 
countries like Germany, England, France, Spain, maybe—we aren’t in the 
same bracket. 
 
I asked if Romania was part of the European Union: 
 
Cristian T:  Technically. On paper. 
Beryx D (♂ 16, parents booksellers): Up till now, I’ve never felt that I’m 
European … and if I felt it, I never got help from anybody—nothing 
changed.  
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Several minutes later, I asked how Europeans were different from other people:  
 
Cristian T:  A sort of breed of efficient people—and wealthy countries—that’s 
about it. Yes, you must have something in common to create a union. 
You don’t have a culture in common, so what remains in the industry? 
The economy. 
Beryx D:  In Europe, most countries are at the same level—for example, in  
Germany, if someone has a problem—let’s say an incurable disease—
the state helps him—gives him money, gives him a place to stay … In 
Romania, no one helps you, you remain on the streets. It’s not the 
same, even if we are in Europe. No one helps us. 
 
And then, further into the discussion, I introduced the idea of Russian membership of  
the European Union. 
 
Cristian T: I think they can’t [join] because if we look at the history, they always 
did different. While we have economic downturns, they register 400 
per cent increases, and being such a big country—sort of hungry for 
more land, for more power—they wouldn’t cooperate well with the 
European Union. They … I don’t see them as people who can obey 
rules very easily, and have common sense. 
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Andrei M (♂15¾ , father an engineer): I also think that it’s not possible … countries 
that [become] a member of the European Union should be those on the 
European continent. 
AR: I’m interested in what you said about Russia being different from ….. 
from whom? From Europe, or from Romania?  
Cristian T: I think from Europe because we try to be sort of politically correct 
here, and they don’t really—they have a sort of—We, we Europeans as 
well—especially you British people—have a history, a habit, of 
exploiting underdeveloped countries, colonies and so on. But they have 
a bigger habit of doing this, and a more recent habit of doing it. 
AR: Do you agree with what Cristian T says? 
Several: Yes, yes. 
AR: I’m going to press you on this—because you’re now talking about ‘we 
Europeans’— 
Cristian T: Aghr! [exasperation at being caught out, and recognition of what he’s 
said] 
AR: But before you said that you didn’t feel European. Can you explain this 
sort of thinking? 
Cristian T: Yes, yes, I know … as a mentality, as a country, I think of us being 
exactly in the middle—I think we incline to be more European-ish than 
Russian. We, we evolved towards the European, I think. 
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When the possibility of Turkish membership was introduced, Andreai M was in 
favour, despite it being located on two continents, but now Cristian T argued that 
‘Russia is much more European’ [geographically]. Andreai T agreed: ‘Well, yes, 
Russia is much more European because their people are more like us, they even look 
more like us—Turkish people, they have a different colour of their skin’; to which 
Emil V (♂ 14½) retorted, ‘The culture isn’t that different’. 
 
Identities at this point become contingent and multiple. Compared with the European 
Union states, Romania (and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria) are seen as outside the group. 
Compared with Russia, both countries moved across the border and became 
European. 
Many in Bulgaria were less opposed to potential Russian membership: Some felt that 
all countries that were in Europe, or even partly in Europe, should become members, 
whereas others perceived Russia as a rich and powerful state that would help the 
Bulgarian economy. But there were also references of cultural and historical affinities 
and divergences: Violeta G (♀ 12¼) said, ‘We have almost a common language’, 
whereas Olga (♀ 12) thought, ‘Russians and Europeans are different, maybe that 
difference would make them feel uncomfortable. … Not only the culture, but the way 
the people think, the way the people act’.  
 
For some of the Bulgarians, Turkey was a particular issue: Ventsislav K (♂ 16½) 
argued, ‘I don’t think I would like it if Turkey joined—I don’t really like them that 
much, because we’ve been their slaves for five hundred years’—to which Vladimära 
G (♀ 16¾) replied, ‘It’s a different generation, and we are not slaves any more, and it 
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doesn’t matter that we have been under them for five hundred years’. Similarly, Petar 
S (♂ 13¾) argued, ‘What happened between Turkey and Bulgaria was a long time 
ago—in the same way it happened in World War II with Germany and the whole 
world—nowadays Germany and the other countries are friendly with each other, and 
so, I think Turkey and Bulgaria should be the same’. Several Bulgarians argued that 
Turkey was too different culturally, and in doing so (as with Cristian T in Romania) 
re-orientated their own sense of being European. Thus Valentin P (♂ 16½, parents 
own a small company) initially said that when he went to other European countries, ‘I 
feel a bit different from them, and not like [a] typical European’, but later he said, 
‘When I went to Turkey, I felt European; when I saw their culture and how they 
live—the culture is different than ours, and I felt European there, because it was 
different … For Turkey to become a member of the Union—their culture is very 
different, and I don’t know how they will reconcile their culture and religion … I 
don’t think they will feel European’. There appeared that, particularly in comparison 
to Turkey, that there was a European culture and one that Bulgarians might possibly 
share. A European culture was initially questioned, and sometimes denied, but 
sometimes followed by a recognition that—when Turkey could be ‘othered’—there 
was a common culture with other Europeans.   
 
<A>SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS   
Bulgaria and Romania present an interesting paradigm in studies of the new 
Europeans. These young people present not just multiple identities, but a confusion of 
multiple identities: proud of Bulgaria or Romania, but sometimes rejecting it—their 
country could be modern, prosperous and ‘European’, but also had a people whose 
‘ways of thinking’ condemned the country to be marginalised, relatively impoverished 
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and unchanging. Theirs was a country in which they could perhaps think that they 
might live and work in for the future, but also a country that they should leave, 
perhaps permanently; marginalised in Europe, but also integral to Europe and at one 
with it in terms of modernity and outlook; in close cultural harmony with their parents 
and grandparents, but also on the threshold of a new generational attitude. They were 
insiders and outsiders. 
 
These constructions strain both Bruter’s (2005) and Jamieson and Grundy’s (2007) 
models of European identity. Were they attached to cultural or to institutional aspects 
of their country or of Europe? In some ways, they were detached from both. Neither 
Bulgarian nor Romanian institutions of government were a focus for identification: 
but there was also a sense of bipolarity about the culture of their country. Aspects like 
the natural beauty, the history and the past were strong themes around which rapport 
was established, but there was ambivalence about the cultural traits of the respective 
peoples, a sense of distancing themselves from the way that ‘Bulgarians thought’ or 
‘Romanian thinking’. Passionate enthusiasm or indifference? Both were evident, often 
expressed by the same individual. There were similar paradoxical relationships with 
Europe: Whereas the institutional structures were welcomed—the mobility, the 
prospects of study abroad, the financial support for the country and sometimes the 
emphasis on rights—the degree to which there was an identification with this is less 
clear. The same is true of the cultural and behavioural aspects of Europeans. In both 
cases these were admired, but not fully participated in: partly because of their 
compatriots own behaviour. Romania and Bulgaria became liminal, territories on the 
border of Europe. But when the lens was shifted to examine states beyond the 
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European Union, then institutional and cultural affinities with Europe moved to the 
fore: Indifference became sometimes a more ardent attachment.  
 
The implications of this for educational settings will become increasingly important 
for Western European countries, as these two countries join the Schengen area in 
2014. From that year there will be free movement of labour from these countries, and 
there are anticipations that, as in the European expansion of 2004, there will be 
reasonably substantial numbers of workers and their families arriving in Britain, 
France and Germany in particular. Romania in particular has a relatively large 
population. Many schools will have pupils from these countries: Young people who 
will feel a strong sense of inferiority when they compare themselves with the ‘real’ 
Europeans who constitute their classmates. Unlike many previous children who have 
migrated from other European backgrounds, these young people will have no strong 
sense of national identity, other than an affection for the natural beauty of their 
countryside. This ambivalence may make itself apparent in various ways, but they are 
likely to be particularly vulnerable to criticisms or aspersions about their country of 
origin, being conscious of being stereotyped disadvantageously. At the same time, 
they will be disorientated by the diversity of the societies they now find themselves 
in: With a well-developed sense of social and national gradations and hierarchies, they 
may try to position themselves above some other migrant groups (and perhaps 
particularly to Roma or Traveller peers), using terms and attitudes that many teachers 
and other pupils will find difficult and problematic, even racist. It will require 
particular sensitivity to understand and react positively to their constructions of 
themselves as liminal beings, uncertain of how their mix of identities socially 
positions them in their new home. 
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